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Talking About Performance or Paying for it? Evidence from a Field Experiment

Manthei, Kathrin - 2019

We investigate the causal effect of conversations about performance and performance pay implementing a 2x2 field experiment in a retail chain. In the performance pay treatments, managers receive a bonus for profit increases. In the performance review treatments, managers have regular meetings...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012867144

Team Incentives and Performance : Evidence from a Retail Chain

Friebel, Guido - 2017

In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3%. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2%...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971148

Team Incentives and Performance : Evidence from a Retail Chain

Friebel, Guido - 2015

We test the effectiveness of team incentives by running a natural field experiment in a retail chain of 193 shops and 1 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016180

Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance

Königstein, Manfred; Lünser, Gabriele K. - 2021

Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317147

The timing of discretionary bonuses : effort, signals, and reciprocity

Boosey, Luke; Goerg, Sebastian J. - 2018

In a real-effort experiment, we investigate how the timing of discretionary bonuses affects the relationship between workers and managers. Average output is substantially higher if bonuses are paid in the middle rather than upfront or at the end, as workers increase first-period output to signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011871948

The Timing of Discretionary Bonuses : Effort, Signals, and Reciprocity

Boosey, Luke - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915741

Emotions and Compensation

Kräkel, Matthias - 2008

their own performances with those of co-workers. I analyze the interplay of emotions and incentives by focusing on a certain … emotions lead to additional incentives and under which the employer benefits from emotional workers, and I sketch the impact of … risk aversion on the interplay of emotions and incentives, and the influence of a worker's success probability on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014214082

Monetary rewards, hierarchy level and working hours as drivers of employees' self-evaluations

Grund, Christian; Soboll, Alexandra - 2023

In this study, we explore the relation between job characteristics and employees' self-evaluations of performance in comparison to their colleagues' performance. Making use of unique individual panel data of ten large firms in Germany's chemical industry, we focus on monetary rewards (bonus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014249264

The Relationship between Delegation and Incentives across Occupations : Evidence and Theory

DeVaro, Jed; Prasad, Suraj - 2023

model where stronger incentives distort a worker's decisions towards low risk-return tasks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255607

Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2006

Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335183