We study the assignment of objects to people via lotteries. We consider the implementation of solutions that are based only on ordinal preferences over the objects. There are three natural ways of comparing lotteries, each of which corresponds to a different notion of Nash equilibrium. For each...

We study a random assignment problem when each agent has possibly multiple demands on objects. In the case of unitary demands, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) introduce the serial rule and characterize it for three-agent economies. We generalize the model to accommodate the possibility that...

We study the problem of assigning objects to a group of agents, when each agent has ordinal preferences over the objects. We focus on probabilistic methods, in particular, the serial rule, introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). Liu and Pycia (2011) show that for each economy with "full...

We develop a stylized college admission model to analyze the effects of need-blind admission policy which requires admission decisions to be independent of applicants’ financial needs. We show that the need-blind admission policy enhances needy students’ enrollment if financial aid offers...

In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...

A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic...

In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...