Agent-based models of market dynamics must strike a compromise between the structural assumptions that represent the trading mechanism and the behavioral assumptions that describe the rules by which traders take their decisions. We present a structurally detailed model of an order- driven stock...

A benchmarking procedure ranks real-valued acts by the probability that they outperform a benchmark B; that is, an act f is evaluated by means of the functional V(f) = P(f B). Expected utility is a special case of benchmarking procedure, where the acts and the benchmark are stochastically...

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change...

This paper studies the performance of four market protocols with regard to allocative efficiency and other performance criteria such as volume or volatility. We examine batch auctions, continuous double auctions, specialist dealerships, and a hybrid of these last two. All protocols are...

This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on...

This paper studies the consequences of removing the resampling assumption from the zero-intelligence trading model in Gode and Sunder (1993). We obtain three results. First, individual rationality is no longer sufficient to attain allocative effciency in a continuous double auction; hence, the...

We study the performance of four market protocols with regard to their ability to equitably distribute the gains from trade among two groups of participants in an exchange economy. We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments. Assuming Walrasian tatonemment as benchmark, there is...

Two agents endowed with different individual conceptual spaces are engaged in a dialectic process to reach a common understanding. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum...

We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic algorithm....