This paper studies overborrowing, financial crises and macro-prudential policy in an equilibrium model of business cycles and asset prices with collateral constraints. Agents in a decentralized competitive equilibrium do not internalize the negative effects of asset fire-sales on the value of...

How does the optimal design of macroprudential capital controls depend on the ability of some agents to circumvent regulation? To address this question, we study the interaction between a regulated and an unregulated sphere in a model economy where pecuniary externalities calls for ex-ante...

This paper develops a non-linear DSGE model to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the build-up of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts to the financial sector relax balance sheet constraints and accelerate the economic recovery. Ex ante, the...

Credit constraints that link a private agent's debt to market-determined prices embody a credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and constrained socially optimal equilibria, inducing private agents to ``overborrow." The externality arises because agents fail to internalize the...

This paper studies the link between banking crises, sovereign default and government guarantees. A banking crisis can lead to a domestic credit crunch, which can be mitigated by government guarantees. However, the provision of bailout guaran- tees exposes the government to potentially severe...

We develop a new framework to study the implementation of monetary policy through the banking system. Banks finance illiquid loans by issuing deposits. Deposit transfers across banks must be settled using central bank reserves. Transfers are random and therefore create liquidity risk, which in...

Credit constraints that link a private agent's debt to market-determined prices embody a systemic credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and (constrained) socially optimal equilibria, which induces private agents to ``overborrow". We quantify the effects of this externality...

We develop a new framework to study the implementation of monetary policy through the banking system. Banks finance illiquid loans by issuing deposits. Deposit transfers across banks must be settled using central bank reserves. Transfers are random and therefore create liquidity risk, which in...

We develop a new framework for studying the implementation of monetary policy through the banking sector. Banks are subject to a maturity mismatch problem leading to precautionary holdings of reserves. Through various instruments, monetary policy alters tradeos banks face between lending,...

This paper studies overborrowing, financial crises and macro-prudential policy in an equilibrium model of business cycles and asset prices with collateral constraints. Agents in a decentralized competitive equilibrium do not internalize the negative effects of asset fire-sales on the value of...