Juan Urrutia ha sido profesor de economía en las Universidades del País Vasco y Carlos III de Madrid. Su impulso a la investigación en el área de economía ha tenido un impacto decisivo en estas dos universidades. En este documento se recogen los textos de las intervenciones que se...

In markets with adverse selection, only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low. Under decentralized trade, however, both high and lowquality units trade, although with delay. Moreover, when frictions are small the...

We show that when firms have asymmetric information about the market demand and theirs costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we...

We study an industry of a homogeneous good where n firms with identical technology compete by first building capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choosing a “reservation price” at which they are willing to sell their entire capacities. We show that every pure strategy...

We study upper semi-continuity of the private core, the coarse core, and the Radner equilibrium correspondences for economies with differential information, with Boylan (1971) topology on agents' information fields.

We study the impact of public and secret reserve prices in auctions where buyers have independent private values and heterogeneous entry costs. We find that in a standard auction the optimal (i.e., revenue maximizing) public reserve price is typically above the seller's value. Moreover, an...