Much of the repeated game literature is concerned with proving Folk Theorems. The logic of the exercise is to specify a particular game, and to explore for that game specification whether any given feasible (and individually rational) value vector can be an equilibrium outcome for some...

We study infinitely repeated anonymous random matching games played by communities of players, who only observe the outcomes of their own matches. It is well known that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium for the prisoner's dilemma (PD) through grim trigger strategies. Little is known...

In the current mobile world, repeated relationships must be self-sustained by the members. We extend the framework of infinitely repeated games to incorporate the possibility that the game is strategically terminated by players. Specifically, we add a voting stage at the beginning of each period...

We propose an extension to smooth fictitious play and prove that play converges to an ε-Markov perfect equilibrium with probability one in a class of stochastic games known as Markov potential games. We then prove a partial Folk theorem for repeated games under one-period perfect monitoring. We...

The folk theorems for infinitely repeated games with discounting presume that the discount rate between two successive periods is constant. Following the literature on quasi-exponential or hyperbolic discounting, I model the repeated interaction between two or more decision makers in a way that...