In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favor of a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a...

A group of N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives. Under Quadratic Voting (QV), agents buy votes in favor of their preferred alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased; the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. We...

In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nash implementation to the domain of weak orders. We identify the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences with a "gap" between necessary and sufficient conditions, both when exactly...

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the persistent lawlessness attitude observed in some transition and developing countries where an overall increase in the quality of institutions is recorded. The mechanism of information diffusion on institutional quality is explored using a model...

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the persistent lawlessness attitude observed in some transition and developing countries where an overall increase in the quality of institutions is recorded. The mechanism of information diffusion on institutional quality is explored using a model...