merger, insiders raise their prices more than the outsiders so consumers search for good deals first at the non … firms receive fewer customers so mergers become unprofitable for sufficiently large search costs. This new merger paradox is …This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competition model where firms sell differentiated products and …

post-merger. We show that this change in the search composition of demand makes mergers incentive-compatible for the firms … primary effects of a merger. Our main result is that the level of search costs are crucial in determining the incentives of …We study mergers in a market where N firms sell a homogeneous good and consumers search sequentially to discover prices …

See also the article <I>Search Costs, Demand-side Economies, and the Incentives to merge under Bertrand Competition … consumers follow whenvisiting firms is equal across non-visited firms. However, after a merger,insiders raise their prices more …</I> in the 'Rand Journal of Economics'(2013). Volume 44, issue 3, pages 391-424.<P> This paper studies the incentives to …

merger,insiders raise their prices more than the outsiders so consumers search forgood deals first at the non-merging stores … receive fewercustomers so mergers become unprofitable for sufficiently large search costs.This new merger paradox is more …This paper studies the incentives to merge in a Bertrand competitionmodel where firms sell differentiated products and …

for a single product while the others search for multiple products. When the mass of consumers who demand one of the … the products are neither complements nor substitutes. In addition, under some conditions, this decrease in demand causes …