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equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signalling game and show that they lead to a reduced probability of selling the … good compared to the symmetric information situation. We compare the unique separating equilibrium of this signalling game …
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This series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on the economic perspectives on branding arising from Moorthy [Moorthy S (2012) Can brand extension signal product quality? <i>Marketing Sci.</i> 31(5):756-770].
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the firm behind the brands. Even with these conditions in place, the signaling argument is fragile: firm observability of … past performance diminishes brand extension's signaling capability; an arbitrarily small probability of failure for good … than signaling product quality. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630456
We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such...
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Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...
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