We study a problem in which a group of voters must decide which candidates are elected from a set of alternatives. The voters’ preferences on the combinations of elected candidates are represented by linear orderings. We propose a family of restrictions of the domain of separable preferences....

We study a problem where a group of voters must decide which candidates are elected from a set of alternatives. The voters’ preferences on the combinations of elected candidates are represented by orderings. We propose a family of restrictions of the domain of separable preferences. These...

A high court has to decide whether a law is constitutional, un- constitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems...

Presentación expuesta en el seminario "Desarrollo de Infraestructuras para un Crecimiento Económico Sostenible. Lecciones Aprendidas de la Experiencia Española", llevado a cabo en Madrid, España, en octubre de 2009. En ésta se analizan los proyectos de infraestructura que se han realizado...

Presentación expuesta en el seminario "Desarrollo de Infraestructuras para un Crecimiento Económico Sostenible. Lecciones Aprendidas de la Experiencia Española", llevado a cabo en Madrid, España, en octubre de 2009. En ésta se analizan los proyectos de infraestructura que se han realizado...

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

We consider the problem of fair allocate an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-•peaked preferences and private endowments. First, we show that the adaptation of the uniform rule to this context is the only selection from the no-envy in redistributions and Pareto efficient...