Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of world trade and two thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed...

We analyze how a price control and the threat of compulsory licensing (CL) affect consumer access in a developing country (South) to a patented foreign product. In the model, the Southern government sets the level of the price control on a Northern patent-holder who chooses between entry and...

We evaluate the case for non-discrimination in the international protection of intellectual property. If trade is not subject to any frictions then requiring national treatment (NT) in patent protection does not have any consequences for innovation (and welfare) since unfavorable discrimination...

Motivated by discussions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on multilateral disciplines with respect to competition law, we develop a two-country model that explores the incentives of a less-developed country (LDC) to offer increased market access (via a tariff reduction) in exchange for a...

This paper examines the preferences of a foreign firm and a welfare-maximizing host country government over two modes of foreign direct investment (FDI): de novo entry by the foreign firm and acquisition of the domestic incumbent. Two crucial features of the model are the presence of network...

Using a repeated game approach, this paper models a North-South trade agreement under which North offers South improved market access (via a tariff reduction) if South agrees to prevent local imitation by strengthening its protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). We show that such an...

We examine sales and leasing of a durable good in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that inefficient firms tend to lease more. While the low cost firm sells more than the high cost firm, the high cost firm leases more. Further, an increase in unit costs implies a higher ratio of leased units to...

In this paper, we consider a three-stage game in the context of a competing exporters model to compare and contrast the effects of discriminatory and uniform (Most Favored Nation, MFN) tariffs on countries' choice over environmental standards for varying degrees of pollution spillovers. Because...

We determine the impact of free trade on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) and incorporate it into the assessment of the net benefits of opening up to free trade. We show that such an analysis can reverse the conclusions reached within a standard one-shot game...