Showing 931 - 940 of 1,018
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897454
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The paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization. Furthermore, a simple model of privatization to an owner-manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897498
There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. Forthcoming) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely self-interested. We qualify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897520
This paper examines how the presence of a non-negligible fraction of reciprocally fair actors changes the provision of incentives through contracts. We provide experimental evidence that principals have a strong preference for less complete contracts although the standard self-interest model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897526
This article develops a model of privatization using an incomplete contracts approach. We argue that different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm, which in turn affect both allocative and productive efficiency. Privatization is seen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897542
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897557
This paper reports on a two-task principal agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece-rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897600
In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897626
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897629