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No News is Good News : Moral Hazard in Oligopolistic Insurance Markets

Cosconati, Marco - 2018

I conduct inference on moral hazard in the Italian automobile in-surance market. I disentangle moral hazard from adverse selection and state dependence by exploiting the non-linearities in the penalties across driving records and companies, and a discontinuity in the cost of accidents in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922786

Public and private insurance with costly transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - 2010

-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private …-country relationship between available indicators of insurance transaction costs and variation in public and private insurance. -- public … transfers ; private insurance ; moral hazard ; transaction costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011636

(M)oral hazard?

Grönqvist, Erik (contributor) - 2006

Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393203

Moral Hazard in Insurance : Theory and Evidence from a Credit Reform in Ghana

Annan, Francis - 2020

provide non-parametric evidence for the existence of moral hazard and recover lower bounds on the costs it imposes in this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847647

Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets : On-Demand Contracts As a Screening Device

Braun, Alexander - 2020

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech sector, can serve as a screening device. To this end, we develop a new adverse selection model consistent with Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978). Consumers have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822927

Mitigating Moral Hazard With Usage-Based Insurance

Holzapfel, Julia; Peter, Richard; Richter, Andreas - 2023

(UBI) contracts that incorporate behavioral risk factors in pricing. Economic theory predicts that any informative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254954

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436518

Privacy Concerns in Insurance Markets : Implications for Market Equilibria and Social Welfare

Gemmo, Irina - 2019

Telemonitoring devices can be used to screen consumer characteristics and mitigate information asymmetries that lead to adverse selection in insurance markets. Nevertheless, some consumers value their privacy and dislike sharing private information with insurers. In a second-best efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860035