biased all-pay auction or lottery contest. While head starts are more effective than multiplicative biases in all …

of the higher type. We then study an auction platform that matches each seller to two agents, and show that the optimal …

trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller offers a price prior to the auction …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …

auction with an additional buyer is conducted. The theoretical model predicts that with risk neutral agents all sales take … place in the auction rendering the negotiation prior to the auction obsolete. An experimental test of the model provides …