Not all who are eligible to receive unemployment benefits actually collect them.

Concealed Earnings fraud accounts for almost two-thirds of the total overpayments due to all fraud.

This article studies a tractable theoretical model of optimal consumption and saving decisions with endogenous retirement. Particular attention is paid to the impact of an increase in the risk of losing one’s job on the optimal path of consumption and wealth accumulation. Even if one does not...

We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided commitment. In the optimal contract, the agentʼs consumption is a time-invariant, strictly increasing function of a single state variable: the maximal level of the agentʼs income realized to date. We...

We study taxation as an alternative to intermediation in a Diamond-Dybvig economy with a private ex post retrade market and with private ex ante investment. The possibility of private investment imposes an additional constraint on the social planner beyond resource feasibility and incentive...

We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer's income in a dynamic principal-agent model of hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and stochastically transit to high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income taxpayer who transits to high income can under-report his...

This paper studies the stability of a stochastic optimal growth economy introduced by Brock and Mirman [Brock,W.A., Mirman, L., 1972. Optimal economic growth and uncertainty: the discounted case. Journal of Economic Theory 4, 479–513] by utilizing stochastic monotonicity in a dynamic system....

In this paper, we develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent's privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time. We characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations and show that,...

We study how best to reward innovators whose work builds on earlier innovations. Incentives to innovate are obtained by offering innovators the opportunity to profit from their innovations. Since innovations compete, awarding rights to one innovator reduces the value of the rights to prior...

We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided commitment. In the optimal contract, the agent's consumption is a time-invariant, strictly increasing function of a single state variable: the maximal level of the agent's income realized to date. We...