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Subjective evaluation versus public information

Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013

and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781395

Subjective Evaluation versus Public Information

Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013

and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334146

Subjective evaluation versus public information

Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013

and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010313115

Subjective Evaluation versus Public Information

Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010660823

Subjective evaluation versus public information

Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Freie Universität … - 2013

and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983220

Overwhelmed by routine tasks : a multi-tasking principal agent perspective

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2022

We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713

Communicating subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2012 - this version: August 2013

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private … evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not … distorted the evaluation downwards. In equilibrium, the wage increases in the agent's performance, when the principal justifies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527

Wealth and the Principal-Agent Matching

Fagandini, Paulo - 2018

I study the role the agent's wealth plays in the principal-agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type, and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Because utility is not perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912553

Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2021

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697032

Objective versus subjective performance evaluations

Terstiege, Stefan - 2013

Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue. While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198959

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