This paper analyzes the role of disclosure enforcement mechanisms (such as SEC enforcement teams and corporate governance systems) in directing the disclosure practices of managers when the information is used by shareholders to monitor the manager. The paper establishes a role for a disclosure...

This paper investigates monotone solutions of the moral hazard problems without the monotone likelihood ratio property. The optimal monotone solutions are explicitly characterized by a concave envelope relaxation approach for a two-action model in which the principal is risk neutral or exhibits...

This article explores a dynamic moral hazard setting in which a principal hires a team of agents for a project. As the project generates revenue upon completion, the principal incentivizes agents' efforts by designing bonuses for success. If bonuses are provided through spot or...

This paper investigates optimal contracts to solve the moral hazard problem with subjective evaluations in the static environment in which the principal privately observes agents’ performances. Despite the limitations of feasible contracts that the principal can credibly offer, we show the...

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the...