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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010206634
measure of secession risk and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession …-regional heterogeneity of preferences. -- majority voting ; secession risk ; cultural distinctiveness ; conflict ; overlapping regional …We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127585
measure of secession risk and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession …We build a model of secession crises where voters may wish to accommodate the minority to prevent secession. We show … risk with respect to the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to economic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124688
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009549287
about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession … minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises … their borders. -- Constitutional commitment ; secession ; signaling ; regional redistribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008699712
We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or toseparate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives tounite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on thewhole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessiveincentives to separate. This leads us...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303324
Although regional resources have been shown to influence secessionist conflicts in developing countries, their effect in established democracies has largely been neglected. We integrate regional resource value and inter-regional transfers in a model on the optimal size of nations, and show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929646
We show that a transfer targeting a minority of the population is sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted, when the probability to receive the transfer is decreasing and concave in income. We apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384383
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010393841
We show that a transfer targeting a minority of the population is sustained by majority voting, however small the minority targeted, when the probability to receive the transfer is decreasing and concave in income. We apply our framework to the French social housing program and obtain that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048895