In the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era corporate insiders were required to report trades in shares of their firm until the 10th of the month following the trade. This gave them considerable flexibility to time their trades and reports strategically, e.g., by executing a sequence of trades and reporting...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements...

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, e.g., by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were...

We show that firms 'in danger' of being delisted from a stock market (NASDAQ) report higher performance-adjusted discretionary accruals and the inflated accruals are associated with an increased likelihood of maintained listing. Accruals of firms 'in danger' are less positive in fiscal quarters...

An underlying objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to provide investors with reliable information, which presumably should increases investor confidence in financial disclosures. In part to achieve this goal, managers now have personal legal liability for internal control over financial...

We examine institutional investors' trading activity during the period preceding firms' annual disclosures regarding the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) required under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). We find consistent evidence suggesting that...