We provide the first experimental results on a two-stage model of militarized conflict based on the ubiquitous ultimatum bargaining game that dominates much of the theoretical analysis of international relations. We illustrate how data from experimental trials deviate from the equilibrium...

Abstract: The authors describe a classroom game that introduces the concept of compensating wage differentials by allowing students to negotiate over the assignment of jobs and wages. Two jobs are designed so that neither job requires special skills, but one is significantly more unpleasant than...

The authors describe a classroom game that introduces the concept of compensating wage differentials by allowing students to negotiate over the assignment of jobs and wages. Two jobs are designed so that neither job requires special skills, but one is significantly more unpleasant than the...

Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail in an impasse. Standard game-theoretic predictions are quite sharp: demands are pushed to the precipice with nothing left on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of...