The corporate governance literature has shown that self-interested controlling owners tend to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Such behavior leads the controlling owners to prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt, to avoid frequent...

I examine the relation between managerial ownership and the maturity structure of corporate public debt by using a sample of newly issued Japanese corporate bonds. Firms with higher managerial ownership issue shorter maturity bonds. In addition, firms with higher managerial ownership have lower...

We study how differences in the aggregate structure of corporate debt financing affect the transmission of monetary policy. Using high-frequency financial market data to identify monetary policy shocks in a panel of euro area countries, we find that: bond finance dampens the overall response of...

Using a cross-country sample of bank-dependent public firms we study the international spillovers of a change in banking regulation on corporate borrowing. For identification we examine how US firms' liabilities vis-à-vis banks, non-bank lenders and bond markets evolve after an increase in...

We study how differences in the aggregate structure of corporate debt financing affect the transmission of monetary policy. Using high-frequency financial market data to identify monetary policy shocks in a panel of euro area countries, we find that: bond finance dampens the overall response of...

Recent empirical studies find that options trading enhances firm value by allowing for a more efficient allocation of firm resources. In this paper, we develop and test the hypothesis that, in addition to a more efficient allocation of firm resources, options trading also enhances firm value...

I investigate the impact of bank capital requirements in a business cycle model with corporate debt choice. Compared to non-bank investors, banks provide restructurable loans that reduce firm bankruptcy losses and enhance production efficiency. Raising capital requirements eliminates deposit...

Models based on asymmetric information predict that debt is least sensitive to private information and cannot explain the illiquidity of corporate debt in secondary markets. We analyze security design with moral hazard and offer a new explanation. First, the optimal compensation contract creates...

This paper analyzes the business cycle behavior of the corporate debt structure and its interaction with economic recovery. The debt structure is measured as the share of bonds in the total credit to non-financial corporations for a quarterly panel of countries over the period 1989-2013. We...