We consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country chooses whether to allow...

Governments often subsidize poorer groups in society to ensure their access to new drugs. We analyze here the optimal income-based price subsidies in a strategic environment. We show that asymmetric health systems can arise even though countries are ex-ante symmetric when international price...

We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher capacity than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country...

In health markets, government policies tend to subsidize poorer groups. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of an income-based subsidy policy on the incentives of countries to implement price arbitrage and of firms to provide market access to poorer groups.

This paper examines whether integration of national markets fosters innovation in the technologically inferior country. In a simple set up where a technologically backward home firm and a technologically advanced foreign firm compete in qualities and prices in an integrated market, we find that...

This paper explores the possibility of international technology transfer in lieu of trade in a model with absolute and comparative advantage. Countries having absolute advantage in producing a good may offer that technology to a possible trading partner against a fee and both the countries might...

We consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country chooses whether to allow...

In a vertically differentiated monopolistic framework with discrete preferences we examine how protecting the low-quality segment raises the incentive for quality innovation. We show how the monopolist facing competitive imports, might fail to exert its complete monopoly power even if there is...