This paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the Competition Authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case. I show that the Competition Authority can then exploit firms' uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even...

Refusal to deal has been a developing prohibition under the Egyptian competition regime. Even though, to date, the Egyptian Competition Authority has never detected a violation of refusal to deal, raising concerns of under enforcement, courts have been able to take the lead and develop the...

Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance...

The traditional institutional model of a competition agency has assumed entrusting competition protection to a single authority. Over time, more and more often national competition authorities are being entrusted not only with competition enforcement but also with other functions (tasks). And...