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A leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh-Shin - 2016

Partly motivated by the recent antitrust investigations concerning Google, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two …-sided markets. We analyze incentives for a monopolist to tie its monopolized product with another product in a two-sided market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011536190

A model of the card payment system and the interchange fee

De Grauwe, Paul; Rinaldi, Laura - 2002

investigate what kind of incentives the interchange fee provides to the actors of the system. We show that the interchange fee …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538993

Network effects, compatibility decisions, and monopolization

Woeckener, Bernd - 1998

Inkompatibilität monopolisiert. Aus der Wohlfahrtsanalyse folgt, daß - je nach der Bedeutung der Netzeffekte, dem Ausmaß der …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010407083

Three essays in microeconomics

Hofmann, Dirk - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009674042

Note on the welfare effect of second-best policies in a network industry : a monopoly case

Toshimitsu, Tsuyoshi - In: Metroeconomica : international review of economics 63 (2012) 3, pp. 429-442

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009674475

Network effects, compatibility decisions, and horizontal product differentiation

Woeckener, Bernd (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009232769

Compatibility and product design in software markets

Woeckener, Bernd (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009232780

Counterfeiting, enforcement and social welfare

Tsai, Ming-fang; Chiou, Jiunn-rong - In: Journal of economics 107 (2012) 1, pp. 1-21

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009611466

Splintering and intertia in network industries

Kretschmer, Tobias - In: The journal of industrial economics 56 (2008) 4, pp. 685-706

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003800436

Dynamic competition with network externalities : why history matters

Hałaburda, Hanna; Jullien, Bruno; Yehezkel, Yaron - 2016 - September 2013, revised March 2016

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes "focal" in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451079