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Stackelberg versus Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs : primary markups, entry deterrence, and a comparison of social welfare and industry profits

Zouhar, Jan; Zouharova, Martina - In: Economic theory bulletin 8 (2020) 1, pp. 89-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012223975

The differential impact of friendship on cooperative and competitive coordination

Chierchia, Gabriele; Tufano, Fabio; Coricelli, Giorgio - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 89 (2020) 4, pp. 423-452

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012305408

Existence, uniqueness and stability of market equilibrium in oligopoly markets

Dzhabarova, Yulia; Kabaivanov, Stanimir; Ruseva, Margarita - In: Administrative Sciences : open access journal 10 (2020) 3/70, pp. 1-32

Bertrand industrial structures with a unified formal method. In contrast to the restrictive theoretical constructs of duopoly … based on studying the response functions of each market participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012271649

On the first mover advantage in Stackelberg quantity games

Annen, Kurt - In: Journal of economics 126 (2019) 3, pp. 249-258

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012017819

Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs

Tesoriere, Antonio - In: Journal of mathematical economics 73 (2017), pp. 86-102

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011842091

Friends or strangers? : strategic uncertainty and cooperation across experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

Chierchia, Gabriele; Tufano, Fabio; Coricelli, Giorgio - 2017

It is commonly assumed that friendship should decrease strategic uncertainty in games involving tacit coordination. However, this has never been tested on two "opposite poles" of coordination, namely, games of strategic complements and substitutes. We present an experimental study having...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660682

The tragedy of the commons : the logic of entry and the dynamic process under two scenarios

Hayakawa, Hiroaki - In: Eurasian economic review : a journal in applied … 7 (2017) 3, pp. 311-328

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777921

When does predation dominate collusion?

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 2, pp. 555-584

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778674

Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers : the case of zero fixed costs

Tesoriere, Antonio - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 71 (2017) 1, pp. 102-117

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011746822

Overconfidence and timing of entry

Santos-Pinto, Luis; Pires, Tiago - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/44, pp. 1-19

-dependent equilibrium where the overconfident player has a higher ex-ante probability of being the Stackelberg leader. Overconfidence lowers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432306