This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the...

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996a, 1999) in pure exchange economies. Firstly, assuming that there exists at least one partially...

We study a social choice model with partially honest agents, and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve secure implementation. This result provides a behavioral foundation for the rectangularity property; and it offers as a by-product a revelation...

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n≥3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR)...

An individual may display an honesty standard which allows her to lie a little without that being harmful to her self view as an honest person. On this basis, the paper considers a society with a finite number of individuals involving partially-honest individuals and in which every individual...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) when agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). First, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable when all...