Motivated by research reporting positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans, we examine price reactions to compensation contracting in experimental markets. The design allows us to manipulate variables separately and study issues of adverse selection (sorting)...

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...

We examine subjects' behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects' beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to...

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...

We design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version of the game serves as a...

This work experimentally examines forecasting and trading behavior. Subjects play the role of both analyst and shareholder over the course of experiments consisting of a series of repeated games with or absent con icts of interest. In a stylized trading setting, I test whether standard...

This article develops a method for drawing samples from which it is impossible to infer any quantile or moment of the underlying distribution. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is...

Sell-side analysts are compensated, at least in part, by brokerage commissions. These commissions create an incentive to bias forecasts to generate trade. Thus, analysts have clear economic incentives to deceive and traders have economic incentives to detect deception. Prior analytical theories...