This paper analyzes the effects of players' relative comparisons in complete information simultaneous-move games. In particular, every individual is assumed to evaluate the kindness she infers from other players'choices by comparing these choices with respect to a given refer- ence level....

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We first show that defection survives as the unique equilibrium of the stage game if at least one player...

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players` equilibrium behavior in both one-shot and infinitely repeated versions of the Prisoner`s Dilemma game. We first show that defection survives as the unique equilibrium of the stage game if at least one player is...

This paper investigates incomplete information and signaling about players?inequity aversion in the simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner?s dilemma game. We first evaluate the role of incomplete information according to: (1) whether uncertainty helps select the effcient equilibrium outcome,...