Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Dedication -- Preface: Human Security in a Global Economy -- List of Boxes and Tables -- List of Acronyms and Abbreviations -- PART ONE: The Human Security Challenge -- 1. Setting the Scene -- The Human Security Challenge -- Human Security -- The UNDP and...

We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in...

We analyze a model in which individuals have hereditary reproductive types. The reproductive value of an individual is determined by her reproductive type and the amount of resources she can access. We introduce the possibility of suicide and assume it is also a genetic trait that interacts with...

We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server that processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either a geometric random variable in...

Proving the folk theorem in a game with three or more players usually requires imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the stage-game payoffs. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) assume full dimensionality of payoffs, while Abreu et al. (1994) assume the weaker NEU condition ("nonequivalent...

We consider a model of competition between two players, each of whom faces a multi-armed bandit problem. A player chooses between activating a risky option (modelled as a Poisson process with unknown arrival rate) to which she has exclusive access, and competing for the use of a single safe...