Based on results of the different fields of the game theoretic literature on strategic interactions and social dilemmas, gift exchange and procedural utility, we argue that corporate social responsibility and relational skills i) with other firms; ii) between employers and workers iii) among...

Based on results of the different fields of the game theoretic literature on strategic interactions and social dilemmas, gift exchange and procedural utility, we argue that corporate social responsibility and relational skills i) with other firms; ii) between employers and workers iii) among...

Based on results from the different fields of the game theoretic literature on strategic interactions and social dilemmas, gift exchange and procedural utility, we argue that corporate social responsibility and relational skills i) with other firms; ii) between employers and workers iii) among...

In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists (a zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete over prices and (costly) socially and environmentally responsible features of their products under a given law of motion of consumer habits. In a...

In our model of socially responsible (SR) product differentiation two duopolists (a zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete over prices and (costly) “socially and environmentally responsible” features of their products under a given law of motion of...

We devise a randomized experiment using task performance in which players (acting as spectators/stakeholders) directly decide on allocation criteria under ignorance or knowledge of the payoff distributions. Our main result is a strong and significant gender effect: women choose significantly...

We outline a model in which preservation of UNESCO heritage sites is analyzed as a classical global public good problem where the decentralized Nash equilibrium yields suboptimal contribution vis-à-vis the Social Planner equilibrium. The absence of a Global Social Planner and the need of...

We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis-à-vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after...