This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at...

A kooperatív játékelmélet egyik legjelentősebb eredménye, hogy számos konfliktushelyzetben stabil megoldást nyújt. Ez azonban csak statikus és determinisztikus környezetben alkalmazható jól. Most megmutatjuk a mag egy olyan kiterjesztését - a gyenge szekvenciális magot -, amely...

We examine assignment games, wherematched pairs of firms and workers create some monetary value to distribute among themselves and the agents aim to maximize their payoff. In the majority of this literature, externalities - in the sense that a pair’s value depends on the pairing of the others...

Jelen tanulmányban megmutatjuk, hogy a tőkepiaci eszközárazási modell (CAPM) levezethető egy három időszakos általános egyensúlyelméleti modellből is, ami felveti a CAPM hosszú távú alkalmazhatóságát is. Bebizonyítjuk továbbá, hogy a modellünk Pareto-hatékony megoldást...

We study assignment games with externalities. The value that a firm and a worker create depends on the matching of the other firms and workers. We ask how the classical results on assignment games are affected by the presence of externalities. The answer is that they change dramatically. Though...

In this paper, we show that the capital asset pricing model can be derived from a three-period general equilibrium model. We show that our extended model yields a Pareto efficient outcome. This result indicates that the beta pricing formula could be applied in a long term model settings as well.

In this paper, we investigate the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) derived from a three-period general equilibrium model incorporating time-inconsistent preferences. We define and consider two types of agents, i.e. they can be either sophisticated or naive. Sophisticated agents take into...

We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...

We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend on the behavior of the other agents. Extending the notion of blocking to this setup is not straightforward; a pair has to take into account the possible reaction of the residual...