The purpose of this book is to review the theory and empirical evidence regarding the impact of dividend policy on shareholder wealth. It cuts to the quick of such long-standing questions as Why do corporations pay dividends? and Why should investors care? With relevant anecdotes, surveys,...

"This paper provides new evidence regarding the information content of debt ratings. We show that noninvestment grade subordinated issues are consistently priced too high (the yield is too low), and the reverse is true for some investment grade bonds. We relate this empirical bias to a notching...

We hypothesize that CEO compensation is optimally designed to trade off two types of agency problems: the standard shareholder-management agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. Analyses in this setup produces two predictions: (1) the...

In this paper, we study how risk-shifting incentives and the design of debt covenants are affected by the pattern of temporal resolution of uncertainty (TRU) in the underlying technology of the firm. We show that the extent of risk-shifting as well as the yield demanded on corporate debt are...

This paper asks whether the stocks of bankrupt firms are correctly priced, and explores who trades the stocks of these firms, and why. Our sample consists of firms that enter into Chapter 11 and remain listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ post-filing. We show that these stocks are heavily traded...

This paper considers the impact of takeover (or acquisition) likelihood on firm valuation. If firms are more likely to acquire during times when they have free cash and/or when the required rate of return is low, takeover targets become more sensitive to shocks to aggregate cash flows and/or to...

We model the reorganization decision of distressed firms. One of the novel features of our paper is that we examine the asset and liability side restructuring decisions jointly to resolve financial distress. Secondly, we model several institutional features of coping with financial distress such...

The authors derive optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude...