We consider a retailer who has two suppliers: one who is RFID enabled and another who is not. Assuming vendor managed inventory (VMI), we address the problem of allocation and pricing of the retail shelf-space. Modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game where the retailer is the leader, we...

We consider a retailer with one radio frequency identification (RFID) enabled supplier and one non-RFID enabled supplier. Assuming vendor managed inventory, we address the problem of allocation and pricing of the retail shelf-space. Using a Stackelberg game where the retailer leads, we observe...

We consider a retailer with one radio frequency identification (RFID) enabled supplier and one non-RFID enabled supplier. Assuming vendor managed inventory, we address the problem of allocation and pricing of the retail shelf-space. Using a Stackelberg game where the retailer leads, we observe...

We study the affect on manufacturers and retailers of attaching radio frequency identification (RFID) tags at the item level in a vendor managed inventory (VMI) system. Our model has one manufacturer and one retailer. We first study the demand processes between an RFID system which uses...

This paper considers the pricing decisions and two-tier advertising levels between one manufacturer and one retailer where customer demand depends on the retail price and advertisement by a manufacturer and a retailer. We solve a Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the leader and the...