This study examines laboratory market outcomes under alternative matching risk scenarios and advance production. Limited access and/or asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers cause a matching problem. When sellers hold inventory before sale and there is buyer concentration, prices are...

Advance production in spot markets increases seller costs because inventories must be held. This cost does not exist in production-to-demand (or forward) markets, for which production follows trading, and sales exactly match quantities produced. Data from laboratory-computerized markets that...

At livestock auctions, the same purchasing agent can represent more than one processor. Repeated multiple-unit English auctions are created in a laboratory to measure the impact of shared agents on trade prices under alternative treatments with six, and as few as two, agents representing six...

Using laboratory markets, this research investigates the impacts of reporting different kinds of aggregated trade information to buyers and sellers who conduct transactions through bilateral/private negotiation. There are a limited number of bargaining rounds or matches between buyer and seller...

In a repeated two-stage game, identical goods are produced and then sold through an ascending auction. Baseline market structures are created in the laboratory with a fixed number of units sold, and either two or four buyers bid as each unit is offered for sale. Bidding rings develop in both...