We study the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discuss the welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of contracts available and on...

The question of an optimal licensing contract in a leadership structure is studied when the patent holder is a non-producer and has three alternative licensing strategies, namely fixed fee, royalty and auction. Assuming once-for-all licensing contracts, we show that royalty dominates other modes...

In a three-country framework, with one innovating country, we study the incentives of non-innovating countries to extend patent pro- tection to the innovator's intellectual property. I assume that non- innovating countries differ with respect to their market sizes and/or imitative capabilities....

We discuss innovative incentives of a local firm when an advanced technology may be available through a foreign firm. The domestic government follows either protection or free trade policy, but there are uncertainties about the realization of a particular policy. We portray the situations in...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the question of pre‐emptive merger decisions in a composite good framework where these goods have both competitive and complementary features. Design/methodology/approach – The paper constructs a model of partial mergers when there are three...

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete information. Therefore, asymmetric information can itself be a reason for outsourcing....