The past and current reluctance of firms and individuals to use private enforcement suggests that there are limited incentives for self-help. The key contribution of private enforcement to overall deterrence derives from cases which would not otherwise be brought, not simply because of resource...

The focus of this paper is the effect of merger proposals on the expected profitability of the bidder and the target. The authors illustrate how an unsuccessful bid may increase the profitability of the target but reduce the profitability of the bidding firm, relative to the profitability of the...

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often,...

Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being...

This paper provides evidence of the incidence and variety of low-price guarantees (promises to match or beat a rival's price) using data obtained from newspaper advertisements in 37 metropolitan areas in the United States. We have a total of 515 low-price guarantees in our sample. We document...

In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations. Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices that are either biased or not adjusted to...