In this paper we provide a binary extension of Dodgson’s non-binary preference aggregation rule. This new aggregation rule is then compared to two other rules which, as Dodgson’s rule, are also explicitly based on distance functions, namely Kemeny’s and Slater’s rule. It is shown that...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a binary comparison of two distance-based preference aggregation rules, Slater's rule and Kemeny''s rule. It will be shown that for certain lists of individual preferences the outcomes will be antagonistic in the sense that what is considered best...

This paper compares binary versions of two well-known preference aggregation methods designed to overcome problems occurring from voting cycles, Copeland's (1951) and Dodgson''s (1876) method. In particular it will first be shown that the Copeland winner can occur at any position in the Dodgson...

The purpose of this note is to shed some light on the relationship between the Copeland rule and the Condorcet principle in those cases where there does not exist a Condorcet winner. It will be shown that the Copeland rule ranks alternatives according to their distances to being a Condorcet...

This paper analyzes the computational complexity involved in solving fairness issues on graphs, e.g., in the installation of networks such as water networks or oil pipelines. Based on individual rankings of the edges of a graph, we will show under which conditions solutions, i.e., spanning...

We propose a procedure for dividing indivisible items between two players in which each player ranks the items from best to worst and has no information about the other player’s ranking. It ensures that each player receives a subset of items that it values more than the other player’s...

This paper provides a distance based analysis of the Borda rule with respect to Condorcet’s criterion. It shows that the minimal Condorcet consistency present in the Borda rule, whenever a Condorcet winner (the alternative that wins against every other alternative in a pairwise contest)...