This paper provides a simple model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect. As in Shleifer and Vishny [1993], we consider the sale of government property (entry permit) by government officials as the prototype of corruption activities. In a dynamic version of the Shleifer-Vishny model,...

This paper provides a new perspective on the validity of the so-called quot;leverage theoryquot;. In a model of preemptive innovation in quot;systemsquot; markets, I examine the effect of bundling on Ramp;D incentives. I find that bundling provides a channel through which monopoly...

We investigate the relationship between market structure and platforms' incentives to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider innovations that...

Contents: Preface by Jeong Pyo Choi -- 1. Introduction and overview / Jay Pil Choi, Wonhyuk Lim and Sang-Hyop Lee -- Part I: Setting the stage -- 2. Competition law and economics: International cooperation and convergence in competition policy / Jay Pil Choi -- Part II: Market structure -- 3....

We examine tippy network markets that accommodate price discrimination. The analysis shows that when a mild equilibrium refinement, the monotonicity criterion, is adopted, network competition may have a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium regarding the winner’s identity; the prevailing brand...