This paper models the interaction of firm insiders and outsiders on a corporate board and addresses the question of the board's ideal size and composition. In the model, the board is responsible for monitoring projects and making CEO succession decisions. Inside directors are better informed...

We identify and compare firms that promote a single executive (successor-incentive) and companies that conduct tournaments (tournament-incentive) among inside managers to succeed the CEO. Successor-incentive firms give more pay-for-performance compensation to the designated successor, are more...

We study the statistical distribution of firm size for USA and Brazilian publicly traded firms through the Zipf plot technique. Sale size is used to measure firm size. The Brazilian firm size distribution is given by a log-normal distribution without any adjustable parameter. However, we also...

The Q-theory of mergers and acquisitions proposes that takeovers of low-Q targets by high-Q acquirers should be value creating as acquirers redeploy the targets' assets. Recent evidence on the direct relationship between Q and value creation is mixed. We present a simple model which suggests...