Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are...

We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect...

We consider a multi-sector overlapping generations model with imperfectly competitive firms in the output markets and wage setting trade unions in the labour markets. A coordination problem between firms creates multiple temporary equilibria which are either Walrasian or of the Keynesian...

The paper shows that, with any rationing mechanism between the efficient and proportional extremes, the Kreps-Scheinkman two-stage quantity-price game reduces to the Cournot model if demand is uniformly elastic and if all costs are sunk at the first stage, thus providing positive results to set...

The article studies a spatial model of commodity tax competition between two countries that may differ in both population density and land mass, synthesizing two earlier contributions where pure strategy equilibria always existed and where the ‘bigger’ country (that with the larger...

With European soccer leagues in mind, a novel model of club owner objectives nests standard profit (and win) maximization, but adds benefactor behavior where owners inject personal funds to increase their team’s quality. A “generosity†parameter differentiates owners; parameter...

Australian governments are early adopters of many electronic record-keeping and reporting systems, and the Australian Standard Business Reporting (SBR) Program evolves this further. This paper examines the evolution from government-centric technologies and standards to collaborative, open, and...