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We provide a critical assessment of the ambiguity aversion literature, which we characterize in terms of the view that Ellsberg choices are rational responses to ambiguity, to be explained by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. First, admitting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783177
A long tradition suggests a fundamental distinction between situations of risk, where true objective probabilities are known, and unmeasurable uncertainties where no such probabilities are given. This distinction can be captured in a Bayesian model where uncertainty is represented by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011154919
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011127591
Rationalizability is a central solution concept of game theory. Economic models often have many rationalizable outcomes, motivating economists to use refinements of rationalizability, including equilibrium refinements. In this paper we try to achieve a general understanding of when this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231341
We show that a simple "reputation-style" test can always identify which of two experts is informed about the true distribution. The test presumes no prior knowledge of the true distribution, achieves any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time, and does not use "counterfactual"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231520
We study the problem of testing an expert whose theory has a learnable and predictive parametric representation, as do standard processes used in statistics. We design a test in which the expert is required to submit a date T by which he will have learned enough to deliver a sharp, testable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860972
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009455326