We analyze two managerial compensation incentive devices: the threat of termination and pay for performance. We first develop a simple model predicting that these devices are substitutes: when termination incentives are low, optimal contracts provide stronger pay-for-performance incentives. We...

Observing whether diversification adds or destroys value is notoriously difficult, leaving open the question of the degree to which any diversification discount can be affected by management quality and oversight. This study uses the unique setting of real estate investment trusts (REITs), which...

While Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have experienced very high growth rates over the past 15 years, the growth in mutual funds that invest in REITs has been even more dramatic. REIT mutual fund returns are typically presented relative to the return on a simple value-weighted REIT index....

We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of Samp;P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements....

This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance structures at the initial public offering date. We test hypotheses that firms with more shareholder-oriented governance structures receive higher valuations at the IPO stage, attract more institutional ownership, and have better long-term...

U.S. corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets, and these cash holdings have been justified in the existing empirical literature by transaction costs and precautionary motives. An additional explanation, considered in this study, is that U.S. multinational firms hold...