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This article analyzes optimal, dynamic portfolio and wealth/consumption policies of utility maximizing investors who must also manage market-risk exposure using Value-at-Risk (VaR). We find that VaR risk managers often optimally choose a larger exposure to risky assets than non-risk managers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005564176
In a recent article Jennrich and Satorra (Psychometrika 78: 545–552, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">2013</CitationRef>) showed that a proof by Browne (British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 37: 62–83, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1984</CitationRef>) of the asymptotic distribution of a goodness of fit test statistic is incomplete because it fails to prove...</citationref></citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241347
The purpose of this paper is to obtain insight into conditions under which a resource exchange alliance can provide greater profit than the setting without an alliance, and to propose a model to design a resource exchange alliance. We first consider a setting in which customers want a combined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371817
This paper analyzes equilibrium in a dynamic pure-exchange economy under a generalization of Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis (IRH). Because of information costs, a class of investors is assumed to possess incomplete information, which suffices to implement only a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005663456
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005757671
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005757954
This article studies an economy with borrowers (firms or individuals) under costly default. Borrowers defaulting under adverse economic conditions may, despite incurring default costs, emerge as wealthier than nonborrowers. Asset substitution is generally not pronounced, although a larger risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005725920
In their seminal paper on the principal-agent model with moral hazard, Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the agent's utility function is $U(I,a)=-e^{-k(I-a)}$, then the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action is increasing in the agent's degree of absolute risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596812