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We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015234575
In this paper, we examine how the introduction of network externalities impact an open and vertically integrated platform's post-merger contractual relationship with third-party sellers distributing through its marketplace. Regardless of whether the platform uses linear contracts or two-part...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013427687
Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018137
There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739597
We study a game in which two competing sellers supplying experience goods of different quality can induce a perspective buyer into a bad purchase through (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize the equilibrium set of the game and argue that an important class of these outcomes features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739599
We study internal incentives, transparency and firm performance in multidivisional organizations. Two independent divisions of the same firm design internal incentives, and decide whether to publicly disclose their performances. In each division a risk-neutral principal deals with a risk-averse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739600
When Legislators introduce laws that award amnesties to 'low-rank' criminals co- operating with the justice, top criminals may bribe public officials to subvert the law. Legislators should anticipate this reaction and fight it back by introducing policies that bundle amnesties for low-rank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739613
We test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement - i.e., the need for graduating the penalty to the severity of the crime. We combine individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744971