We present stylized facts on the asset pricing properties of cryptocurrencies: summary statistics on cryptocurrency return properties and measures of common variation for secondary market returns on 222 digital coins. In our sample, secondary market returns of all other currencies are strongly...

We develop a model in which two profit maximizing exchanges compete for IPO listings. They choose the listing fees paid by firms wishing to go public and control the trading costs incurred by investors. All firms prefer lower costs, however firms differ in how they value a decrease in trading...

We study the term structure of interest rates in a two-tree exchange economy. Even when one of the trees is very small, interest rates are determined differently than in a single tree economy. Rather than always being flat, the yield curve is usually upward sloping but may be downward sloping....

Uniswap is one of the largest decentralized exchanges with a liquidity balance of over 3 billion USD and daily trading volume of over 700 million USD. It is designed as a system of smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain, and is a new model of liquidity provision, so called automated market...

We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes and McGuire (2001) to find a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium. Given the stationary equilibrium, we generate artificial time series and...

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We...

We consider a rationing mechanism for selling a common-value object, in which the seller solicits sealed bids, and allocates the objects with equal probability to one of the k highest bidders, at the (k+1)th highest price. When k gt; 1, this mechanism exhibits rationing. When k=1, it reduces to...

We develop a dynamic model of price competition in broker and dealer markets. Competing market makers quote bid-ask spreads, and competing brokers choose commissions to be paid by an investor. Investors, who submit either market or limit orders, choose a broker to minimize total transaction...