We demonstrate how an evolutionary agent-based model can be used to evaluate climate policies that take the heterogeneity of strategies of individual agents into account. An essential feature of the model is that the fitness of an economic strategy is determined by the relative welfare of the...

The general question of how environmental dynamics affect the behavioral interaction in an evolutionary economy is considered. To this end, a basic model of a dynamic multi-sector economy is developed where the evolution of investment strategies depends on the diversity of investment strategies,...

We consider a heterogeneous agent-based economic model where economic agents have strictly bounded rationality and where income allocation strategies evolve through selective imitation. Income is calculated by a Cobb-Douglas type production function, and selection of strategies for imitation...

In this paper we present an overview of methods and components of formal economic modelsemploying evolutionary approaches. This compromises two levels: (1) techniques ofevolutionary modelling, including multi-agent modelling, evolutionary algorithms andevolutionary game theory; (2) building...

A spatial welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability is developed. It incorporates agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative environmental externalities and various land use categories. The model is used to compare rankings of spatial configurations...

This paper offers an economic value assessment of a nature protection programme in the Veluwe. This programme involves two defragmentation scenarios: the first scenario connects the central part of the Veluwe with the IJssel river forelands in a north-eastern direction, while the second scenario...

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and...