We formalize a conception of authority, which is commonly defined as the right of controlling a person's actions embedded in human assets in sociology. Due to the inalienable property of human assets, the contractible formal authority is hard to verify and enforce, while real authority usually...

We analyse incentive problems in collective production environments where contributors are compensated according to their observed and ranked efforts. This provides incentives to the contributors to choose first best efforts.

We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes-a "team"-as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once...

We study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnerships form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities may arise that make partners? skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatible partnership contract...

We study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnerships form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities may arise that make partners ̕skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatible partnership contract...