In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires...

We will show that some results in Goyal and Moraga (2001), RAND Journal of Economics 32(4), are incomplete. The results are the social welfare and the total profit of the firms in the complete network is lower than those in some networks. They focus on the symmetric network gk where k is the...

We will show that some results in Goyal and Moraga (2001), RAND Journal of Economics 32(4), are incomplete. The results are the social welfare and the total profit of the firms in the complete network is lower than those in some networks. They focus on the symmetric network gk where k is the...

This study considers a school choice problem with general feasibility constraints. Each student belongs to a grade; and two students belonging to the same grade are symmetric, whereas those belonging to different grades can be asymmetric with respect to the feasibility constraint of a school. We...

We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms each of which derive a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching. Since there is a method to derive a stable matching, we can derive a...