We consider school choice when the priority of a student for a school is conditional on who the other students are. Students have one of several types and the type distribution in the school matters. As a special class of our priority rules, we introduce the adjusted scoring rules and show that...

We will show that some results in Goyal and Moraga (2001), RAND Journal of Economics 32(4), are incomplete. The results are the social welfare and the total profit of the firms in the complete network is lower than those in some networks. They focus on the symmetric network gk where k is the...

In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires...

We consider a pairwise kidney exchange model. Roth et al. (2005) define priority matchings of the model and introduce a mechanism to derive them. In this paper, we re-examine the priority matching. First, we consider a general priority ordering where multiple patients may hold equal priority. We...

In this paper, we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric. We show the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. The proof is a constructive one and therefore we provide a method to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium within a reasonable...