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This paper studies optimal decision rules for a decision maker who can consult two experts in an environment without monetary payments. This extends the previous work by Holmström (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) who consider environments with one expert. In order to derive optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280752
We study the problem of optimal contract design in an environment with an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed experts. We characterize optimal contracts and observe that consulting two experts rather than one is always beneficial; this is so even if the bias of a second expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464583
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826710
This paper studies optimal decision rules for a decision maker who can consult two experts in an environment without monetary payments. This extends the previous work by Holmström (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) who consider environments with one expert. In order to derive optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008739211
We provide a sufficient condition under which an uninformed principal can infer any information that is common knowledge among two experts, regardless of the structure of the parties’ beliefs. The condition requires that the bias of each expert is less than the radius of the smallest ball...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662394
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010152285
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver's report about his type. We establish the equivalence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963449
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff. This condition is equivalent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238431
A sender designs a signal about the state of the world to persuade a receiver. Under standard assumptions, an optimal signal censors states on one side of a cutoff and reveals all other states. This result holds in continuous and discrete environments with general and monotone partitional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247743
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227360